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Are there Edenic grounds of perceptual intentionality?
* 
 
 
The essays in “The Character of Consciousness” sketch a comprehensive theory of intentionality, 
aimed at explaining how linguistic items and mental states get their contents. The framework of 
two-dimensional semantics includes the thesis that sentences, beliefs, and experiences each have 
two sets of contents, and an explanation of the underlying dispositions that ground those 
contents. The contents take the form of two intensions. Primary intensions correspond to the 
cognitive significance of the utterance, belief, or experience, while secondary intensions 
correspond to environmental aspects of their meaning. 
 
In the case of experience, the two-dimensional framework is supplemented with a story about the 
role of phenomenal character in grounding the contents of experience. Every phenomenal aspect 
of experience finds expression in the framework of representation, in the form of a satisfaction 
condition. Experiences of objects have one type of satisfaction condition, experiences of 
properties have another, and when combined, they produce conditions on veridicality of 
experiences – not just visual experiences, but experiences in all sensory modalities, including 
bodily sensations. The phenomenal character of experiences is thus deeply connected to 
representation. “Intentional content appears to be part of phenomenology: part of the essential 
nature of phenomenology is that it is directed outward at a world (371).” In fact, according to 
Chalmers, phenomenology is systematically connected to intentional content twice over. And 
here Chalmers’s discussion of the phenomenal grounds of representation contains two 
independently motivated ideas. 
 
The first idea is that phenomenal character, all by itself, determines a unique profile of properties 
that the world would have to instantiate, in order for it to be the way it appears. For any 
experience, we can ask: how would the world have to be, in order to be precisely the way it is 
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experienced? The idea that this question always has an answer is the conceit of Eden, a mythical 
place that embodies the perfect match between things in the world and our experiences of them. 
In Eden, things mirror how they appear, by having exactly the properties that they appear to 
have. 
 
The mythical construct of Eden vividly illustrates a set of constraints on veridicality placed by 
phenomenal character. Eden shows us what the world would be like, if the constraints placed by 
phenomenal character were fully met. The constraints are that things have perfect properties, 
which by definition mirror phenomenal character. Chalmers argues that our world is not Eden, 
because (for the most part) perfect properties are not instantiated. But the fact that the constraints 
are not met here does not stop our experiences from having Edenic contents, which are a form of 
Russellian content, composed of objects and perfect properties. He proposes (somewhat 
speculatively, 454) that our relation to Edenic contents constitute the fundamental nature of 
phenomenal character.   
 
The second idea is that the phenomenal character of experiences does not determine a unique 
profile of properties that the world would have to instantiate, in order for it to be the way it 
appears. Instead, the phenomenal character of an experience determines a satisfaction condition 
that can be met by a wide range of properties. The satisfaction condition includes causal 
constraints and structural constraints. For instance, a phenomenally red experience imposes the 
constraint that to be veridical, experience has to be caused by the property that normally causes 
phenomenally red experiences, and that stands in structural relations of color similarities – and 
that could be any property that is properly embedded in the environment. Satisfaction conditions 
of this sort make up the Fregean contents of experience. Fregean contents co-vary with 
phenomenal character, though different properties satisfy those contents in different worlds.    
 
These two ideas about the relationship between phenomenal character and representation can 
seem directly at odds. According to the first idea, each experience determines a unique profile of 
properties such that the experience is veridical, only if those properties are instantiated, whereas 
according to the second idea, each experience determines a veridicality condition that can be met 
by different properties in different worlds. Chalmers thinks the two ideas peacefully co-exist, by 
virtue of a tacit switch between standards of veridicality. When we focus on the conditions that 
mirror phenomenal character, we hold experience to perfect standards. At other times, we relax 
the standards for veridicality, and count experiences as veridical, even when things as they are 
don’t mirror phenomenal character. The relaxed standards of veridicality are supposed to be the 
default, whereas perfect standards of veridicality exaggerate the need for veridicality conditions to match phenomenal character. We can take a perspective on our experiences (either as theorists 
or as introspectors) in which we hold it to perfect standards. But in taking this perspective, we 
depart from our ordinary standards of veridicality.  
 
The two phenomenal contents differ starkly. On the one hand, Edenic contents both mirror 
phenomenal character and constitute its fundamental nature. Our experiential relation to Edenic 
contents is a relation of acquaintance to perfect properties that rules out a priori certain forms of 
ignorance about those properties (430). We’re acquainted with their instances in Eden, and with 
uninstantiated universals in fallen worlds.
1 Given the constitutive role of Edenic contents in 
phenomenal character, acquaintance with perfect properties helps explain how we can be 
acquainted with our own experiences as well. In particular, experiences of perfect properties help 
ground pure phenomenal concepts, which play a central role for Chalmers in his theory of 
introspection and his response to anti-dualist attempts to explain away the explanatory gap. By 
contrast, the Fregean contents of experience merely co-vary with phenomenal character without 
mirroring it, and without constituting its basic nature. They embody an epistemically much 
weaker relation to imperfect properties than perceptual acquaintance, and they do not explain the 
introspective acquaintance Chalmers finds one level up – acquaintance with experiences.  
 
The most important difference between the two phenomenal contents regards our first-person 
phenomenal perspective on the external world in perception. The Edenic contents best reflect 
that perspective, whereas the Fregean contents reflect it imperfectly at best, or at worst, not at all. 
This difference could be summarized in Chalmers’s remark that “Presentational phenomenology 
does not wear its Fregean content on its sleeve” (435). Phenomenal contents are not monolithic 
in how they reflect the first-person perspective we have on the external world in perception.  
 
I’ll use “presentational phenomenology” for phenomenal character that goes with our first-
person perspective on the external world in perception.
2 In Chalmers’s framework, 
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defends 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view 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2
  ￿ Chalmers glosses “presentational phenomenology” like this (371): “the way that 
[perceptual experience] seems to directly and immediately present certain objects and 
properties in the world” presentational phenomenology is the Edenic content relation. The notion need not be defined in 
terms of his framework, but it is motivated by his idea that the contents that reflect the first-
person perspective differ from those that reflect ordinary veridicality conditions.  Absent 
Chalmers’s distinction between the two phenomenal contents, presentational phenomenology 
would be phenomenology, simpliciter.   
 
Once we zero in on presentational phenomenology, we can ask what psychological and rational 
roles it plays in perception and perceptual belief. In perception, Chalmers claims that Edenic 
contents ground epistemically rigid concepts, which rule out various kinds of ignorance about 
perfect properties (265). I argue in section 1 that even in Eden, a kind of ignorance could arise 
that Chalmers claims to rule out. In section 2, I make the case that given Chalmers’s 
commitments, Fregean contents must do all the heavy lifting in perceptual belief. Those contents 
explain which perceptual beliefs we form, and how they are justified. I argue that the resulting 
epistemology of perceptual belief rests on an implausible psychological thesis: we systematically 
fail to take at face-value our first-person perspective on the external world.  Chalmers’s thesis 
that there are two phenomenal contents has the implausible consequence that the contents that 
determine what we normally believe in perception differ from those that most immediately 
reflect our first-person perspective. This consequence is a reason to doubt that phenomenal 
contents divide in the way Chalmers proposes. 
 
 
1. Are there Frege cases in Eden? 
 
It is natural to think that acquaintance with a property would rule out ignorance about its intrinsic 
nature. In Chalmers’s framework, one version of this idea is that acquaintance with a property 
grounds a concept of that property that is epistemically rigid, where this means that its primary 
intension picks out the same referent in every epistemically possible scenario (265).
3 If a and b 
are epistemically rigid, then a=b is a priori. Epistemic rigidity yields an idealized analog of 
acquaintance: when a and b are epistemically rigid concepts of the same property, ideal a priori 
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 ￿ Chalmers holds that epistemically rigid concepts typically also pick out the same 
property in every metaphysical possible world (they’re subjunctively rigid, 265). 
 reflection will reveal that they are the same property (from now on take the idealization as 
implicit). In what follows, I will take acquaintance with a property to be understood in this way.  
 
Chalmers apparently holds that we are acquainted with perfect properties, in the sense operative 
here. He says that experiences of perfect properties are associated with the same primary and 
secondary intensions (404). And in his theory of introspection and his interpretation of the 
explanatory gap, he relies on the idea some of our concepts of our own experiences – the pure 
phenomenal concepts – are epistemically rigid. Chalmers seems committed to the existence of 
concepts of perfect properties (call these “Edenic concepts”) that are epistemically rigid. Given 
that experiences are supposed to consist in acquaintance with Edenic properties, if experiences 
do not ground epistemically rigid Edenic concepts, then it is hard to see how there could be 
epistemically rigid phenomenal concepts.  
 
All subjects can have Edenic concepts (if any can), given the assumption that experiences consist 
in a relation to (sometimes uninstantiated) perfect properties. If our experiences of perfect 
properties ground Edenic concepts that are epistemically rigid, then there are no Frege cases 
involving perfect properties. In such a Frege case, a subject experiences the same property on 
two occasions, but for all her experience or a priori reflection tells her, it may not be the same 
property both times. If we are acquainted with flatness twice over, once visually and again 
through touch, then we can know a priori that the same property is experienced both times. 
 
Before turning to the apparent examples of Frege cases in Eden, it is useful to distinguish 
between different ways to endorse an experience. 
 
Consider Edenic Mary, who has never seen colors before. Suppose Mary knows that she is about 
to see either red or green, and that she will thus have either a phenomenally red or a 
phenomenally green experience.
4 She is shown a red swatch, and has a phenomenally red 
experience. Since she doesn’t know that the swatch is red, she does not form the belief that 
would be most natural to express by saying “The swatch is red”. But she believes that the swatch 
has the color property that it appears to have. If we distinguish between the standing concept of 
red and a demonstrative concept of red, we can describe Edenic Mary’s situation by saying that 
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  ￿ Stalnaker 2008 discusses a case like this. 
 when she endorses her experience, she uses a demonstrative concept of redness (that color), but 
does not apply her standing concept of redness. 
 
Edenic Mary illustrates the difference between endorsing an experience while conceptualizing it 
using a standing concept, and endorsing it without conceptualizing it in that way. This distinction 
figures in the Frege cases that I argue could arise in Eden.  
  
 
Intramodal Frege cases 
 
Imagine you are bicycling on a road. You can feel the difference between going uphill, going 
downhill, and traversing a flat surface. Feeling the slope of the road through pedaling is a kind of 
haptic tactile perception, akin to feeling the consistency of soup by stirring it with a spoon. 
 
When you feel the slope of the road through pedaling, you feel it in part by feeling resistance 
when you pedal. There is little resistance going downhill, a lot going uphill, and a medium 
amount on flat roads. Although felt resistance is only one aspect of tactile experiences of the 
road, it is a partly constitutive of it. Absent any feeling of resistance, you could not feel the road 
through pedaling at all (cf Smith’s (2002) discussion of the Anstoss). You feel the flatness of the 
road, by feeling its resistance. You can’t factor out the experience of flatness from the experience 
of the road’s resistance to your pedaling. The tactile experience of flatness cannot be isolated 
from the feeling of resistance, in the way that a cyclist could arguably isolate the flatness-
experience from experience of their energy level, or from other factors that always accompany 
tactile spatial experiences. 
 
Felt resistance to pedaling can be caused by many factors besides the slope of the hill, both 
mechanical (muddy surface, dirty chain), and energetic (more resistance is felt when the cyclist 
has a relatively lower energy level, and less resistance with a higher energy level – even on flat 
roads.) There is thus a range of degrees of resistance one could feel when pedaling on a flat 
surface. In this range, is there a unique degree of resistance that could figure in veridical tactile 
experiences of flatness? If not, then given the constitutive role of feelings of resistance in tactile 
experience, flatness could be mirrored in Eden in more than one way. The multiplicity in degrees 
of felt resistance won’t preclude mirroring between the road and the way phenomenal character 
presents it. 
 
We should expect to find multiple tactile experiences that mirror flatness. One’s energy is always at some level. Variations in it can affect degrees of felt resistance, and the variations can be 
slight. Felt resistance can change, even when vestibular (and visual) cues that indicate orientation 
to the ground stay the same. Given these micro-changes in felt resistance, it seems arbitrary to 
select a unique degree of resistance that reveals perfect flatness. Perhaps at the extremes, utter 
exhaustion could create the illusion that the road slopes up, and high energy the illusion that it 
slopes down. But in the large middle range, there is not plausibly a unique point at which perfect 
flatness is revealed.  
 
A potential gustatory analog is the taste of alcohol. You may taste the alcohol in beer, rum-
soaked cake, and wine sauce on fish, but it is not exactly the same alcoholic flavor each time. 
You cannot completely isolate the flavor of alcohol from its surrounding flavors. (And you need 
not be experiencing the ‘high-level’ property of being alcohol to taste the alcohol, and more than 
tasting the sweetness of sugar involves experiencing the high-level property of being sugar.) 
 
These examples suggest a first challenge to the Edenic picture. Edenic content is supposed to be 
Russellian, so that any phenomenal difference is a difference in which perfect properties are 
experienced. But if there are phenomenally different experiences with which one can experience 
flatness (or alcohol), then such contents (Edenic or otherwise) cannot be Russellian. I’ll focus on 
flatness. 
 
Even if there are multiple phenomenally different ways to experience perfect flatness, that does 
not yet show that there are Frege cases in Eden. It could be that for any pair of phenomenally 
distinct experiences in which one experiences perfect flatness, it is always knowable a priori that 
the same property is experienced both times. If so, then whenever one experiences perfect 
flatness, one is acquainted with it. 
 
Let’s stipulate that someone believes a road is flat if she believes it is flat, using a standing 
concept of flatness. I argue below that a subject who is competent with the concept flat, often 
applying it correctly and confidently to roads she experiences as flat, might find herself in what 
I’ll call a cyclist situation (since my example involves bicycling): she (i) experiences a road as 
flat, (ii) knows by introspection exactly how the road appears to her with respect to slope, and 
(iii) is rationally unsure whether the road is flat, even though she endorses her experience (for 
instance by using a demonstrative concept that picks out the slope of the road).  
 
If cyclist situations could happen, then Frege cases are near. Call the subject’s putative 
experience of flatness in the cyclist situation ‘b’, and let ‘a’ be any experience of flatness when she is disposed to apply her standing concept to the property she experiences. For this subject, ‘a 
= b’ will not be a priori. 
 
Here is an example of the cyclist situation. Suppose you are riding on a flat road, feel resistance 
to degree N, and are rationally disposed to judge on that basis that the road is flat. Since so far, 
the experience could be a straightforward case of experiencing flatness, call this experience ‘a’, 
and let’s say it occurs at time t1. 
 
Now for the putative experience ‘b’. At time t2, your legs feel tired, and the felt resistance is 
degree N+, phenomenally not much different from felt resistance degree N. Memory tells you 
that it just got harder to pedal. You’re sure that you are more tired than at t1, but not sure whether 
increased resistance is due entirely to decreased energy level.  
 
Could your experience of the road at this point be an experience of flatness? Of course your 
experience could be caused in a normal way by flatness, but could it be an experience that 
presents the road as flat?   
 
To see why it could, consider the different experiences a subject in this situation could in 
principle have. The options are these: 
 
Slope illusion: At t2, the tired cyclist experiences the road as sloping upward. 
Indeterminacy: At t2, the tired cyclist experiences the road as having a slope that is nearly flat - 
somewhere in the range from flat to slightly inclined. 
Flatness: At t2, the tired cyclist experiences the road as flat. 
  
The key point favoring the flatness possibility is that competence with the standing-flatness 
concept does not plausibly require being rationally disposed to apply it in response to every 
experience representing perfect flatness – assuming any non-experiential factors relevant to 
rationally applying the concept are in place. (From now on, I’ll assume that the non-experiential 
factors relevant to justification are the same in the isolated and successive conditions, and leave 
this assumption implicit). Expert cyclists would respond to any such experience by applying the 
standing flatness-concept. But novice cyclists may not always rationally be able to distinguish 
between increases in felt resistance that are due to drops in energy level, and increases due to 
slight changes in the grade of the hill (undetected by vestibular or visual experience). The 
rational response for them in a cyclist situation, given that they endorse their experience, is to 
suspend judgment on whether the road is flat.   
To rule out the flatness option, Chalmers would have to hold that every non-illusory experience 
of flatness “resolves” from having less determinate to more determinate content upon the subject 
applying the standing concept to it. But it is implausible to suppose that the transition from 
partial to full expertise would have to change experience in this way. Not even proponents of the 
idea that changes in expertise can change the contents of experience (such as Siegel 2010) hold 
that every such change changes the contents of experience. Some learning is phenomenologically 
stable: the experience stays the same, and one simply learns that a standing concept is 
appropriately applied in response. Given the wide range of experiences of flatness, due to the 
wide range of degrees of resistance, there will be numerous occasions on which subjects 
experience flatness by feeling a novel degree of resistance.  
  
An opponent might object that it is conceptually impossible to possess a standing flatness-
concept, yet lack the rational disposition to apply it in response to an experience of perfect 
flatness. On this view, a subject who is rationally disposed to suspend judgment on flatness in 
response to their experience cannot be experiencing perfect flatness. This view assumes that the 
minimal experiential bearers of phenomenal character always align exactly with the minimal 
experiential bases that determine what (if anything) is rational to believe on the basis of the 
experience. But those two things do not always align.  
  
For instance, suppose you simply started out feeling resistance N+, without coming to it via 
feeling resistance N. Call this the isolated condition, and suppose that it is rational for you to 
judge on the basis of your tactile experience including N+ that the road is flat. In the contrasting 
successive condition, you first feel resistance N and then resistance N+.  If the rational responses 
to the N+ experiences have to be the same in both conditions, then the rational responses are 
symmetrical.   
 
Symmetry: If it is rational to judge that the road is flat on the basis of the N+ experience in the 
isolated condition, then it could not be rational to suspend judgment on the basis of felt 
resistance N+ in the successive condition. 
 
One might support the symmetry claim as follows. By hypothesis, feeling resistance N+ is 
phenomenally the same in both conditions. If the experiences are phenomenally the same, they 
must present the same property. So if the presentation of that property is the main experiential 
factor determining which doxastic attitude is rational to take, then we should expect the same 
doxastic attitudes to be rational each time.  
In reply, there is reason to reject the symmetry claim. In the successive condition, N+ is part of 
an extended tactile experience that differs phenomenally from the tactile N+ experience in the 
isolated condition. Holding constant any non-experiential factors that may matter for 
justification, the doxastic attitude that is rational to adopt in the successive condition is plausibly 
determined by the extended experience, not by the N+ portion of it on its own. The N+ 
experiences are the same in both conditions, yet rational responses to the experiences differ, 
because the experiences that determine those responses differ in each case. In the successive 
condition, the N+ experience taken on its own is not available as an experiential basis for any 
rational judgment about slope of the road. It would be irrational to ignore the other portion of the 
extended experience when forming an attitude on the basis of tactile experience about whether 
the road is flat. Here the minimal experiential bearers of phenomenal character do not align 
exactly with the minimal experiential bases that determinate what (if anything) is rational to 
believe on the basis of the experience.   
 
My defense of Frege cases involving flatness in Eden rests on two central theses. First, there is 
no phenomenally unique experience of flatness. Second, subjects could rationally suspend 
judgment on whether a road is flat, in response to an experience of flatness that they endorse. My 
case for the second thesis relies on the idea that the temporally surrounding experiences can 
influence how it may be rational to respond to such an experience of flatness, even holding 
constant non-experiential factors relevant to justification. 
 
The putative Frege case here involves two experiences in the same sensory modality. I now turn 
to Frege cases where the same property is experienced in different sensory modalities. 
 
Intermodal Frege cases 
Chalmers’s idea that there are no Frege cases involving perfect properties dovetails with the 
thesis that experiences of the same spatial property in different sensory modalities share a 
phenomenological commonality. Often when we feel and see something flat, we know that the 
property we’re seeing is the same as the property we’re feeling. Chalmers suggests that this 
knowledge comes from phenomenology alone: 
 
Phenomenologically, it seems that when an object looks flat and when it feels flat, it looks and 
feels to have the same property (flatness). This commonality seems to hold in virtue of an 
internal relationship between the phenomenology of visual and tactile experiences (395). 
 The cyclist case could be adjusted to create an intermodal Frege cases which raises additional 
challenges to the Edenic picture. Back in Eden on your bicycle, it is t2 in the successive 
condition. While pedaling you feel resistance N+. Simultaneously you see the road, and it looks 
just the way it looked at t1: flat. At t2, going by vision alone, you’d endorse your visual 
experience and apply the standing flatness concept to the road. At the same time (t2), going by 
tactile perception alone, you’d suspend judgment on whether it is flat, just as in the intramodal 
case. 
  
One might think intermodal cases would be avoided if Edenic spatial experiences were always 
amodal, rather than being experiences within a sensory modality. If there are only ever amodal 
experiences of spatial properties, rather than distinctly visual and distinctly tactile experiences, 
then the phenomenal differences between sensory modalities would not provide a foothold for 
Frege cases. But this way of avoiding intermodal Frege cases seems at best to be a way to move 
the bump in the carpet somewhere else. Visual flatness has a visual aspect, tactile flatness has a 
tactile aspect. On the amodal option, Chalmers would need to account for this phenomenal 
difference, consistently with the idea that all differences in phenomenal character are reflected in 
content relations (“part of the essential nature of phenomenology is that it is directed outward at 
a world”). Given that we can see flatness, what world-directed visual aspect of this experience is 
left over, once flatness is experienced amodally? There don’t seem to be enough world-related 
properties to go around. 
 
A different attempt to prevent intermodal Frege cases would countenance two perfect flatness 
properties, one each for visual and tactile experiences of flatness. But if these properties are 
phenomenally different, then it is hard to see where the “internal unity” Chalmers describes 
enters in. He might reply that even if there is no internal unity at the level of experience, ideal 
reflection shows that it is epistemically impossible for flatnesstouch ≠ flatnessvision (where these are 
the two perfect flatness properties). But why is the best explanation for putative intermodal 
cyclist-based Frege cases that the subjects fail to ideally reflect on their experiences, rather than 
that they need more practice applying spatial concepts in the full range of circumstances?  
 
A last type of potential Frege case involves number.  Consider creatures who can add taps to 
taps, and flashes to flashes, but not taps to flashes. If they cannot perform numerical operations 
across sensory modalities, it seems natural to suppose that they also cannot know on the basis of 
experience or a priori reflection whether the number of taps = the number of flashes, even when 
the number is six both times. Why does this ignorance preclude the number six from mirroring 
any of these experiences of quantity? If mirroring isn’t precluded, then it seems that creatures in Eden with these limited intermodal capacities would be subject to Frege cases involving number. 
In fact, it seems that such Frege cases could arise in us, even though we can add across 
modalities. Suppose you hear six taps, grouped into three pairs, and then see six flashes in a row 
(thanks to Ned Block for the example). We might not know just on this basis whether it was the 
same number of flashes and taps each time.  
 
One might reply that Frege cases here don’t arise because the number six is not represented in 
these experiences under the mode of presentation six, but rather under the mode of presentation 
the number of flashes [/taps]. That reply raises the question of how either of the experiences 
would be phenomenally different, if six were represented under the mode of presentation sixness. 
Since in Eden, flashes mirror our experience of them, how many flashes are there, if their 
number is not represented under the mode of presentation six? (This is a version of the speckled 
hen challenge.) Pending answers to these questions, these cases suggest that we are not 
acquainted with the properties that mirror our experience of them. 
 
I turn next to Chalmers’s account of the role of presentational phenomenology in perceptual 
belief. 
 
 
2. Chalmers’s psychology of perceptual belief   
 
Although Edenic contents and Fregean contents are motivated independently, Chalmers thinks 
there is an explanatory connection between them which centers on matching, a relation between 
perfect and imperfect properties. Consider redness. In a world w, F has to match perfect redness 
as well as possible, in order to be imperfect redness in w. Two aspects of matching are being a 
normal cause of phenomenal redness, and standing in certain structural relations to the normal 
cause of other color experiences. In our world, imperfect redness might be surface spectral 
reflectance property SSR21, whereas in another world it might be SSR22. Fregean contents by 
definition approximate Edenic contents, via the matching constraint on imperfect properties.  
 
In Eden, perfect and imperfect properties coincide, so the two phenomenal contents of an 
experience always have the same truth-value. Fregean contents with their matching condition are 
motivated by the divergence in truth-values of the two phenomenal contents after Eden’s demise. 
The mythical version of the fall is evocative: perceivers “eat from the trees of science and 
illusion.” The non-mythical version is elusive: Chalmers never explains what the psychological 
analog is of “eating from the trees”, characterizing it instead in partly mythical terms:   
It was eating from the Tree of Illusion and the Tree of Science that led us to doubt that we live in 
an Edenic world. Moreover, eating from these trees was an empirical process based on empirical 
discoveries about the world (413).   
 
On a natural interpretation, we believe that things are (mostly) not exactly the way presentational 
phenomenology presents them. Chalmers suggests that we actually have those beliefs, not just 
that science would justify them: “Before eating from these trees, there was no special reason to 
doubt that our experience was perfectly veridical” (413).  
Absent such beliefs, we would presumably end up believing Edenic contents when we endorse 
our experiences, when nothing else is stopping us from taking experiences to be veridical. Yet 
Chalmers holds that we end up believing only its Fregean contents, because what we believe is 
presumably determined by our standard of veridicality. Ordinary standards of veridicality are 
imperfect standards. Without the tree-eating part of the myth, there would be no motivation for 
positing imperfect veridicality conditions. Edenic contents with their perfect veridicality 
conditions would already respect intuitions about veridicality.   
 
In holding that we don’t believe Edenic contents of experience, Chalmers holds that in forming 
normal perceptual beliefs, we discredit the face value of our first-person perspective on the 
external world. Call this the Psychological Defeat Hypothesis.  
 
The Perceptual Defeat Hypothesis seems to support Chalmers’s view about what is rational to 
believe, if you know that presentational phenomenology is veridical. Suppose you see a 
pomegranate, and have the presentational phenomenology that goes with phenomenal redness. 
Then you learn that your experience is veridical, using the ordinary standard of veridicality. 
Since Chalmers identifies ordinary veridicality with imperfect veridicality, no special training 
should be needed to apply imperfect standards of veridicality, even if you have never engaged in 
the special act of holding an experience to a standard of perfect veridicality, or reflected 
explicitly on the distinction between standards that underlies the two-stage view. 
 
In these circumstances, we might expect that people would believe that the pomegranate has the 
properties that their first-person perspective attributes to it. And intuitively, it would normally be 
rational for a perceiver to believe that the pomegranate has these properties. This idea is 
expressed by the following principle:  
 (*) If S has the presentational phenomenology that is part of phenomenal redness when she sees 
a pomegranate, and knows that her experience is veridical by ordinary standards, then it is 
rational for S to believe that the pomegranate has the properties attributed to it by presentational 
phenomenology. 
 
Principle (*) is compatible with a range of theories about perceptual justification. Perhaps the 
conclusion is made rational, exclusively by presentational phenomenology, together with your 
knowledge that the experience is veridical. Or perhaps the rational basis for this conclusion 
includes justification to believe that there is an external world or that in general, experiences are 
not misleading (Wright 2004), and that you always have such justification. Let’s suppose we do 
always have such justification, whether we need it to form justified perceptual beliefs or not. 
Even given this assumption, Chalmers has to deny principle (*). Presentational phenomenology 
attributes perfect redness (and perfect spatial and temporal properties) to the pomegranate, 
whereas the ordinary standard of veridicality is imperfect veridicality. And if you learn that your 
pomegranate-experience is imperfectly veridical, according to Chalmers, it would be rational to 
conclude to that the pomegranate is imperfectly red.  
 
Chalmers’s denial of (*) might seem more plausible if the Psychological Defeat Hypothesis is 
true. That hypothesis predicts that if you told S that her experience was veridical, she would 
disregard presentational phenomenology and believe Fregean contents instead. But there are 
several reasons to doubt the Psychological Defeat Hypothesis. 
 
First, ignoring presentational phenomenology is difficult, whether or not we have good reason to 
do so. Partially cured schizophrenics report that their auditory hallucinations (in which they hear 
voices speaking to them) become much easier to ignore, when they take medication that “turns 
down the volume”.
5 The psychiatrist Brendan Maher observed that many delusional symptoms 
are explained in part by abnormal experiences.
6 His observation derives its explanatory power 
                                                        
5
  ￿ I first heard this reported at a Harvard Mind, Brain, and Behavior Symposium by a 
patient who was being interviewed by his psychiatrist Donald Goff, who said such reports are 
common. See also Siris et al (2012). 
 
6
  ￿ Maher (1999). 
 from the assumption that people find it difficult to disbelieve their senses. The difficulty is not 
plausibly limited to the mentally ill. Skeptical verdicts that we shouldn’t believe our senses are 
famously hard to live by. Or consider Franco, who talks to his cousin in a disdainful voice, even 
though his words express admiration for the very way his cousin inhabits the earth. If you read 
Franco’s words on a page, you would rationally conclude that he feels strongly positive towards 
his cousin. But to draw this conclusion on the basis of hearing Franco speaking, you would have 
to disregard his disdainful tone, which is at least as salient as his words.
7 The facts that 
disregarding it is rational for you, and that you know that it is, in no way predicts that you will 
actually ignore it.    
 
In reply, Chalmers might say that the difficulty in disbelieving applies only to Fregean contents 
of experience, not to presentational phenomenology itself. But it’s hard to see why the difficulty 
should apply selectively in exactly this way. What’s difficult is ignoring our first-person 
perspective on the external world. That perspective is mirrored by Edenic contents, and is 
definitive of presentational phenomenology. 
 
A different reply for Chalmers is that appearances are not uniformly difficult to discount. Some 
are, some aren’t. Blaring television or surrounding conversations sometimes but don’t always 
force their way to the center of attention, and their deliverances aren’t always taken up into 
belief. But this observation doesn’t help, because presentational phenomenology does not always 
recede from uptake in this way.  
 
Chalmers does not specify the exact content of the “doubt that we live in an Edenic world.” I’ve 
assumed that the doubt consists of beliefs that reject Edenic contents. But perhaps instead, in the 
non-mythical analog of Eden, what we believe is only that it is possible that things that appear 
perfectly F fail to be perfectly F. Then tree-eating beliefs would not give us reason to reject 
Edenic contents. 
 
This weaker tree-eating belief makes it more puzzling why we should end up believing Fregean 
contents and not Edenic contents. Standard skeptical arguments articulate possibilities in which 
things are not as they appear, but believing these possibilities are rarely effective at changing the 
                                                        
7
  ￿ Perhaps even more salient, if (as seems likely) affect is processed faster than semantic 
information. 
 beliefs we actually form. Given Chalmers’s suggestion that we don’t believe Edenic contents, it 
seems best to stick with the natural interpretation of the tree-eating beliefs, whatever their exact 
contents are. 
 
 
The rational role of presentational phenomenology 
 
Principle (*) concerns what is rational to believe, if you know that presentational 
phenomenology is veridical. A related question is what is rational to believe on the basis of 
presentational phenomenology itself. Given that tree-eating beliefs are at odds with 
presentational phenomenology, what is the rational response to having both?  
 
Everyone should agree that if the theory of refraction tells you that straight, submerged sticks 
look bent, while your experience of a stick being submerged tells you the stick changes shape, 
you should not believe your experience. In this piecemeal conflict between visual experience and 
vision science, science wins. In contrast, Chalmers’s view posits a systematic conflict between 
experience and science in which science wins. Every instance of presentational phenomenology 
that presents spatial magnitudes, duration, or color properties – and that is just about every 
instance - is at odds with the science of perception (presumably a tasty fruit on the tree of 
science).  
 
Where does our justification for believing Fregean contents come from, if not from 
presentational phenomenology and the Edenic contents that mirror it? A first option is dogmatist: 
experiences provide immediate, prima-facie justification for believing F-contents, by virtue of 
phenomenal Fregean contents. No justification for supplementary beliefs is needed. Dogmatism 
would apply equally to Edenic contents: experiences provide prima-facie justification for 
believing those, but the tree-eating beliefs defeat them. But this conclusion may not sit well with 
a natural account of how tree-eating beliefs are justified. If those beliefs reject Edenic contents, it 
is hard to see how the Edenic deliverances of experience could help justify them. Yet presumably 
vision science, like any science, is justified in part by the deliverances of experiences. So 
presumably Fregean contents do all of the justifying, even in Eden. Tree-eating beliefs are 
justified part by experiences, but only in virtue of Fregean phenomenal contents, not in virtue of 
Edenic contents. This suggests that like secondary intensions of mental states, Edenic contents 
never explain the rational role of experiences. If so, then they do not provide any justification for 
believing their contents – not even prima facie justification that gets defeated by tree-eating 
beliefs.  
Given Chalmers’s overall picture, a more natural epistemology of perception follows the lead of 
traditional indirect realism, making presentational phenomenology and the Edenic contents that 
go with it rationally idle. On this picture, justification for believing Fregean contents of 
experience relies on introspective beliefs self-ascribing presentational phenomenology, together 
with beliefs that one is in the kind of normal conditions that would make Fregean contents true.
8 
In this structure for perceptual justification, it doesn’t matter what form experiences take: they 
could be raw feels, sense-data, or contentful states. The fact that they have contents at all, Edenic 
or otherwise, plays no role. 
 
Chalmers’s picture is already similar traditional indirect realism in holding that the aspects of 
experience that define our first-person perspective – sense-data or qualia for the indirect realists, 
Edenic contents for Chalmers – do not by themselves identify the propositions that we typically 
go on to believe, or that we are typically justified in believing, upon having the experience. 
Traditionally, experiences fail to identify these propositions, because they have an entirely 
different subject-matter from perceptual belief: mental objects or raw feels, rather than external-
world objects and their properties.  In Chalmers’s picture, Edenic contents have the external 
world as their subject-matter. But the similarity remains, since Edenic contents (via the matching 
condition) only indirectly determine the contents we normally believe in response to the 
experience.  
 
The indirect semantic connection Chalmers finds between presentational phenomenology and 
justified perceptual belief takes some dramatic forms. He argues that we have justified beliefs in 
the Matrix scenario. Your body – or at least, the body that houses your brain might be forever 
strapped to a chair, but that fact alone does not rule out that your experience as of walking in 
Tucson is veridical. How could you be walking in Tucson, if your body is strapped to a chair? 
Chalmers argues that your experience can be imperfectly veridical, even if its supervenience base 
happens to be inside the head of a body that is strapped to a chair.
9 Similar consequences pertain 
                                                        
8
  ￿ I’m encouraged in this suggestion by the fact that Chalmers (2012) expresses 
sympathy with it in a more recent discussion of structuralist responses to skepticism. 
 
9
  ￿ More exactly, your brain* is in the body walking in Tucson, but the brain housing the 
supervenience base of your experience is in the body strapped to a chair. to our spatial experience, which Chalmers says tolerates great discrepancies between the spatial 
properties that figure most immediately in our experience, such as the Edenic size and shape of 
one’s hand, and the corresponding imperfect properties. These consequences rely on the idea that 
the deliverances of presentational phenomenology do not directly determine what we believe on 
the basis of experience.  
  
Some theorists who oppose indirect realism would criticize Chalmers’s epistemology of 
perceptual belief, on the grounds that it saps away rational force that properly belongs to 
presentational phenomenology. My criticism is instead that it saps away its psychological force 
in perceptual belief formation. If the phenomenal contents that mirror phenomenal character are 
divorced from those that track assessments of veridicality, then phenomenal character is 
neutralized as a chief determinant of what we normally believe in response to our experience.  
From there, it may be natural enough for phenomenal character to be rationally idle, as well. But 
the implausibility starts earlier, with the division between how things most immediately seem to 
us in perception, and what we go on to believe. 
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